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Resumo
Este estudo analisa como fatores políticos e institucionais afetam a efi-
ciência do gasto municipal no provimento do bem estar para a população
ao longo da década dos noventa. O modelo adota a abordagem da fron-
teira de produção estocástica, condicionada por variáveis relacionadas ao
custo da provisão dos serviços e os incentivos que afetam a eficiência mu-
nicipal. O resultado indica que não podemos rejeitar: 1) economias de
escala; 2) o efeito da margem de voto no município e do tipo de mandato
(primeiro ou segundo) do governador eleito, indicando uma forma de cli-
entelismo; e que 3) a política local e a existência de comitê setoriais não
afetam o nível da eficiência do gasto, o que sugere assimetria de informa-
ção entre os políticos e os eleitores.
Keywords: economia política, eficiencia serviço publico, fronteira estocás-
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Abstract
This study analyses how political and institutional factors affected the
performance of municipalities in improving social welfare in Brazil in the
period from 1990 to 2000. The model adopts a stochastic production fron-
tier, conditioned by variables related to the provision costs of services and
those that can affect municipal efficiency. The results indicated that we
can not reject:1) economies of scale; 2) the effect of vote margin in the
municipality and the type (first or second) of mandate of elected gover-
nor, which indicates a form of patronage; and 3) that local politics and
the existence of sectorial boards did not affect the level of efficiency for
municipal spending, suggesting an asymmetry of information between
politics and voters.
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1 Introduction
A social planner should use municipal funds to maximize the quality of life
of local residents. In other words, local tax revenues and transfers from the
state and federal level should finance the responsibilities of the municipality1
to supply basic education, health care and other public services. Elected lead-
ers, though, often have other objectives besides benefiting their constituen-
cies. Municipal management can be affected by local conditions and by the
electoral dispute for local offices or the local votes for state and federal of-
fices. Our objective is to investigate whether the electoral dispute and insti-
tutional characteristics affect the provision of municipal services. This moti-
vates efforts to estimate the efficiency of municipal management in transform-
ing public funds into services for the population, and explains the sources of
this difference.
In this article we propose a measure for the spending inefficiency of Brazil-
ian municipalities during the 1990s and relate this measure to institutional
characteristics and electoral dispute, which can alter the conditions and in-
centives for the supply of public services. To do this we use the stochastic
production frontier model, which distinguishes inefficiency and its determi-
nants, and an approach to mitigate the bias due to unobservable factors. It
should be clear that in this approach the inefficiency measure is constructed
by comparisons among municipalities. Therefore, this is only a relative mea-
sure of inefficiency. The non-experimental nature of the data utilized and
the possibility that the institutional characteristics and the electoral dispute
are determined together with social conditions and public spending limit the
scope of our results2.
There is an extensive body of literature examining the effect of political
and institutional conditions on public expenditure. The initial normative eco-
nomic literature on public spending, as in Atkinson & Stiglitz (1980), summa-
rized the social planner’s problem into the allocation of resources that max-
imize social welfare and affect the distributive impact.3 Later, median voter
models were developed, in which expenditures are electorally decided and
decline with the tax contribution of the median voter in total spending. These
models resulted in an extensive body of empirical literature, as summarized
in Cutler et al. (1993). In contrast, models that describe strategies to capture
spending by interest groups, as summarized in Peltzam (1993), focus on per-
ceived benefits.4 In countries where the median voter receives less income
than the median voter, spending would be higher and more aimed at social
problems (Meltzer & Richard 1981). This, however, does not ensure that pub-
lic spending will be more efficiently utilized and result in reduced inequality,
1In Brazil, the local administrative unit is the municipality, which is roughly the same as a
county, except that it has a single administration, under a mayor and municipal council. Urban
municipalities correspond basically to single cities, while rural ones can take in several small
towns or villages. The Constitution provides a mechanism for parts of municipalities to split off
and form separate units.
2With non experimental data it is hard to select valid instruments that permit identifying
causality relations.
3. In the first case, we consider the unweighted sum of the utilities, and in the second, dis-
tributive weights can be used.
4Strömberg (2006) develops a median voter model with focus on the benefits of interest
groups, a model in which spending grows with the median voter’s perception of the personal
benefit in the total benefit.
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since imperfections in the political market affect this process of transforming
voter preferences into results.
The literature on the provision of public services uses the theory of in-
dustrial organization when the monopoly power that governments have on
public spending is politically contested, and thus examines the entry and exit
barriers that determine the quality and quantity of services and the extrac-
tion of rent. Examples of this approach are Lake & Baum (2001) and Keefer &
Khemani (2005). The political market is open to competition in democracies,
since in this case there is no regulatory barrier to entry. However, the exis-
tence of sunk costs (campaign and reputation-building costs) creates barriers
that reduce competition. Similarly, the distribution of the costs of voter par-
ticipation is crucial for core or swing voters to exercise their influence. With
a small percentage of voters at low cost, the monopolist rent of the state tends
to be captured by these voters.
More recently, the principal-agent model has been considered to explain
how competitive the political market is in converting voter preferences into
results of public expenditures (for example,Dixit (1996),Dixit (2002);Burgess
& Metcalfe (1999)). Voters’ difficulty in observing politicians’ performance
generates information asymmetry for voters that reduces political competi-
tion, and therefore also reduces the incentives politicians have to offer non-
excluding public services.
The asymmetry between politicians and voters is explained as the result
of the difficulty of measuring performance - sometimes with multiple dimen-
sions, sometimes with indistinct dimensions,- and inefficiencies in the pub-
lic service productive chain. Although the voter is the principal, additional
agency costs can occur. With the presence of multiple principals between the
political decision and the enactment of the service, for example, distinct ob-
jectives among the spending overseer, doctor and patient of the public health
service may exist. Since each principal wants to induce greater effort from
the agent, the incentives to efficiency that the agents perceive end up being
low and distorting.5 In the literature, incentives have been proposed so that
agents’ efforts maximize the combined payoff of the multiple principals, and
thus avoid inefficiencies above the normal agency costs (see Besley & Ghatak
(2003))6, which vary from payment for performance (merit or product) to the
freedom of choice of users and to transparency instruments.
This literature lists factors that condition the allocation and efficiency of
spending, from the viewpoint of the median voter. In this study, we use those
variables to evaluate the varying level of inefficiency of Brazilian municipal-
ities in using the technology of converting public resources into services and
seek to explain this heterogeneity.
Empirical literature exists measuring the efficiency of public expenditures
in relation to various social and institutional indicators. For example, Afonso
et al. (2005) and Afonso & Aubyn (2005) use nonparametric models and an-
alyze the resulting ranking econometrically regarding income, institutional
factors (government transparency, property rights regime and quality of the
bureaucracy), trust in politicians and trade openness. They find evidence that
only income and institutional variables are significant. Estache et al. (2007),
5There are externalities, then, that increase the agency cost.
6Which range from payment for performance (merit or output) to transparency instruments
and sanctions.
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using parametric models, also make international comparisons of sectorial
spending on energy, transportation and education, models that include qual-
ity of bureaucracy and level of corruption as variables. The results by income
class indicate that average efficiency diminishes with income and that institu-
tional variables are not significant. Needless to say, such results must be taken
with caution due to the well-known econometric problems of cross-country
comparisons regarding fixed effects on parameter estimation.
Following a political economy approach, Alston et al. (2007) analyzes the
performance of state governments in Brazil, using public expenditures, wealth
of politicians and campaign spending as performance measures regressed
against political and social control variables. The results of specifications with
the interaction among the variables indicate that in nearly all cases political
competition and social control are substitutes.
Our study will compare the efficiency of conversion of public expenditures
into public services amongmunicipalities and investigate the determinants of
these efficiency levels, by examiningmunicipalities that have the same general
institutional environment. In doing so, we consider direct measures of the
quality of life of the population to evaluate government output and propose
an approach to mitigate the effect of unobserved variables for non-panel data.
Section 2 discusses the adopted methodology, Section 3 describes the indi-
cators and Section 4 presents the empirical results. The conclusion is the last
section.
2 Methodologies
The transformation of spending into the public services that condition the
state of public education and health, henceforth, just “state” is a complex and
lengthy process that depends on the initial state, the volume of expenditures
and the efficiency with which these are made. This efficiency of spending, in
turn, depends on the relation between the benefit and cost of the effort to in-
crease administrative effectiveness. Hence, the heterogeneity of this effective-
ness among municipal governments can be explained both by the incentives
that public administrators perceive to try to be more efficient and by local
supply conditions, which alter the marginal cost of this effort. The availabil-
ity of data delimits the interpretation of the results. We measure the social
conditions at the start and end of the decade, and consider the real per capita
expenditures made during the decade. Therefore, the inefficiency measure
refers to a municipal characteristic that is in some form shared by all three
municipal governments in this period7. This approach has the advantage of
considering the ultimate purpose of public spending, and the disadvantage of
indirectly measuring the performance of government management. This mu-
nicipal characteristic can perhaps be rationalized by arguing that the public
bureaucracy is fairly stable, as are the population/voters.
The state of the population is the result of multiple actions of the munic-
ipal government, some of which can affect the result although not directly
related to the provision of services. We assess the combined performance of
the administration of each municipality (combined in the sense that we are
7Municipal elections (for mayor and city council) are held every four years, offset with elec-
tions for president, governors and national and state legislators, also held every four years. In the
study period, there were municipal elections in 1992, 1996 and 2000.
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considering the activities and also all the governments in the 1990s). Since
the allocation of resources among functions is an endogenous process, we
specified the production function as having multiple interdependent outputs
generated by a single input, represented by total budget spending. With this
specification it is useful to define the model as a production possibility fron-
tier that determines per capita spending (g), given the measure of the state S
and given a level of municipal inefficiency (u), in the form g , S, x, z, u.8
This relation is conditioned by 2 types of variables: 1) related to the cost
of supplying services and that are not under control of the mayor (x); and 2)
that affect efficiency (z).
2.1 Model
The factors affecting the cost of service considered are the population’s demo-
graphic conditions, themunicipality’s degree of fragmentation and favouritism
in receiving transfers from the state9. Favouritism of state governments can
provide additional funds not observed in the public accounts (in a form of
patronage) and reduce the mayor’s cost of attaining the same level of service
to the people. The demographic conditions, concentration of population in
the urban area, its age profile and the size of municipalities alter the supply
cost, due to the scale returns, access cost and type of service demanded.
The incentive to efficient municipal administration depends on the degree
of political competition, the population’s interest in participating in decisions
and the mayor’s profile. In municipalities with greater political competition
for mayor or councilors, the mayor’s effort, coeteris paribus, tends to be greater
and might explain a greater level of efficiency. When a greater portion of
revenues come from transfers, on the other hand, there can be an incentive to
moral hazard by leaders, and hence inefficiency.
A better-informed electorate can heighten demand for efficient govern-
ment. The characteristics of municipal administration that affect the cost of
providing services can, however, give more or less transparency to perfor-
mance when there are sectorial advisory boards – education and health – or
outsourced government services and computerized processes. We consider as
factors that condition efficiency those that directly affect the electoral perfor-
mance of the mayor or depend on his or her direct action.
However, public services have a cost to maintain the level of the social
indicators (S) and an additional cost to promote their improvement (see the
list of S in the appendix). With the available information it was not possi-
ble to identify these two processes. This suggests that the specification of
the technology is ambiguous. If the most important element is to maintain
a particular service, the most suitable specification is the state measured by
the average value (S1 + S0); if the most important element is to promote im-
provement, the best specification is the variation (S1 − S0); and if the two are
equally important, the unrestricted specification is most suitable (S1, S0).
The result of supplying municipal services, measured by social indicators,
depends on implementing permanent policies that have longmaturation hori-
zons. In line with this, we considered average budget spending per inhabitant
8Or efficiency if signal is changed.
9For the sake of simplicity, we consider only the effect of the competition by the state govern-
ment. The competition by the federal government is often intermediated by the state government,
and the results of the two government levels are correlated.
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during the analyzed period and the population state at its start and end, ob-
tained from the 1991 and 2000 Demographic Censuses.
As mentioned before, the proposed model assumes that the municipal ad-
ministration “produces” the population’s state S, making a per capita expen-
diture g (measured in logarithms), with the cost-conditioning factors mea-
sured by x, and the efficiency incentives measured by z. We assume it is im-
possible to identify the relation between spending on the various municipal
service provision units and their results, so that it is only possible to mea-
sure the relation between the production possibility surface, Sβ, and the log
of total per capita spending, g .
This Sβ − g relation is then explained by two groups of observed condi-
tional variables: 1) the cost of supply (x); and 2) the efficiency (z) of manage-
ment; and two stochastic terms: 1) the distance from the production frontier
(u), which is identified with the asymmetric form of its distribution; and 2)
a random term. The asymmetry is induced by the existence of a frontier that
increases the chance that the agents are near it. Naturally, it is an empiri-
cal question to verify whether the unobserved component is asymmetric, and
thus whether this model can be estimated with the data sample under study.
This model is known in the literature as the stochastic frontier production
model (see Coelli (1996)).
The determinants of management efficiency (z) can be incorporated into
the model according to two descriptions for the form of inserting the x vari-
ables in the model, described with the models indicated below. Model (a)
assumes x and z are correlated and the frontier is homogeneous. For model
(b) z is independent and the frontier is heterogeneous, varying with (δz). The
equations below describe these cases.
Homogeneous:
g = Sβ − xγ + δz − u + e, e ∼N (0,σ2), u ∼ E(δ0) (1)
Heterogeneous:
g = Sβ − xγ − u + e, e ∼N (0,σ2), u ∼ E(δz) (2)
2.2 Mitigating the bias of unobservable factors
The bias due to unobservable or omitted variables is a critical question in
identifying a variable’s effect in empirical tests. It may be that relevant un-
observable quantities are related to the variables of interest, leading to undue
attribution of explanatory power and mistaken conclusions. This question is
hard to resolve, precisely because it involves unobservable factors. The usual
approach in the literature to mitigate this bias is to use a fixed-effects model,
which can be estimated when panel data is available. The characteristics of
the problem addressed here - long maturation of social processes and the dis-
crepancy between the dates of elections and of census data collection10 – only
permit one observation per municipality at this moment, making the usual
approach impossible. Instead of the fixed-effects model, which eliminates the
bias of omitted variables that are stable in time, we propose this approach that
eliminates the bias of omitted variables that are stable in space.
10The spending data are annual, but the social indicators are only available for the census
years, 1991 and 2000
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In the model y|x, when there is a unobserved variable z correlated with x,
and y depends on x and z, the effect of z is attributed to x. This is a difficult
question that is mitigated by formulating hypotheses about the characteristics
of the omitted variables. A usual approach with panel data is to suppose
that z is constant for each (m) or has a temporal trend or is steady such that
(∆zm = 0) or (∆Zm = uzm), in which case the model estimated with fixed effect
in the spatial dimension (m) eliminates the effect of z when uz is independent
of y. Variables of this type generally vary smoothly in time, for example,
geographic and climatale or some economic and social conditions.
In this work the social conditions are only observed in 1991 and 2000 and
are correlated with the flow of annual expenditures, which makes a temporal
identification with ∆zm impossible. In this case, the effect of the variable z
can be eliminated when z has a spatial trend. The spatial trend is the smooth
variation of a quantity over space, either because the physical medium does
not jump or because economic and social processes propagate to neighbouring
regions. Below we present the rationale behind these two approaches.
y = βx +γz+ e. (3)
Temporal Hypothesis: if z does not depends on time (∆z = 0) or has a temporal
trend (∆z = z − z−1 = uz, uz ∼ N (0,σ2), uz⊥y), then the operator ∆ eliminates
the effect of z.
∆y = β∆x +γ∆z +∆e = β∆x + e∗ (4)
Spatial Hypothesis: if z has a spatial trend (∆wz = z −Wz = uw, uw ∼ N (0,σ2),
uw⊥y), then the operator (∆w) eliminates the effect of z. Where W is a neigh-
bourhood matrix11andWz is the local mean of z
∆
wy = β∆wx +γ∆wz +∆we = β∆wx + e∗ (5)
The two constructions have advantages and limitations; in both cases the
hypothesis of independence cannot be tested since z is not observed, but in
the case of the temporal difference, the robustness of this hypothesis can be
evaluated when one has samples with more than two observations in time.
In contrast, the spatial difference assumes spatial trends capture the selection
bias of non-observables, a hypothesis that tends to be more realistic when the
units are smaller and more mutually homogenous.
In the two cases, the model with the transformed variable generates the
unobserved terms of the stochastic frontier model, distance from the frontier
and random term (u,e) also transformed. Thus, the asymmetric term of the
model with the transformed variables is the deviation of the distance from
the frontier. In the case of the temporal difference, if inefficiency is an id-
iosyncratic property of the unit, the transformed model eliminates this effect,
which means that in this case the error loses the asymmetry property. In con-
trast, in the case of spatial difference, if the inefficiency is idiosyncratic and
thus does not present a spatial trend, the asymmetric term is preserved. In
this case, the asymmetric term measures the deviation of the distance in re-
lation to the mean distance of the neighbours and it becomes an empirical
question to verify whether the asymmetry property is preserved.
11W (i, j) = −1/n(i) any time i is a neighbor of j , and n(i) is the number of neighbors of i.
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3 ELectoral and institutional indicators
The direct investments and expenditures of the state and federal governments
benefit the people of the municipalities. These outlays, made according to the
interest of the governor, benefit different municipalities differently, improv-
ing the population’s state. These outlays are not computed in the municipal
budget, and for this reason they can be seen as reducing – for the municipality
– the production cost. The interest is represented by the electoral performance
in the municipality by the then- candidates for governor, - state government
– whose performance is measured by the margin of victory over the runner-
up candidate12. This type of spending (a form of patronage) directly by the
state government, is not discriminated spatially by municipality in the state
budget, which impedes its direct measurement13.
The elected executive or administration that wishes to run for re-election
has different incentives for patronage measures than one with no possibility
of another mandate. A dummy variable identified the governor re-elected in
the 1998 election.
The inhabitants of municipalities have the option of redefining their polit-
ical map by breaking away from the existing one and forming a new munici-
pality. This was a particularly intense process in the 1990s. Constitutionally
mandated transfers are approximately defined per inhabitant, so the fragmen-
tation of a municipality does not change the joint revenue of the old and new
units – transfers and the local tax base remain the same14 – nor does the pop-
ulation served differ. Nevertheless, the fixed costs of the local executive and
legislative apparatus increase with the multiplication of municipalities. Thus,
the number of them contained within a comparable minimum area can be
used as an indication of these costs. Although this fragmentation into smaller
units can put government in closer touch with citizens, its overall effect is an
empirical question.
An important part of local budgets comes from constitutional transfers
from the state and federal governments. The transfer between governments
makes the relation between the public that pays taxes and that part of the pub-
lic which receives the corresponding benefits more indirect, which in princi-
ple generates less social control over the manager.
The incentive for the mayor to manage local affairs better depends on the
degree of institutional and social control, other institutional questions and
the electoral benefit of the mayor. Institutional control can be related to
the mayor’s political party and can be exercised through sectorial munici-
pal boards. These incentives were considered through five types of variables:
the existence of sector boards; modernization of the public administration; a
dummy for reelection of themayor; degree of competition for mayormandate;
and the political party of the elected mayor.
12normalized by the number of inhabitants
13This kind of relation exists for federal level too. Due to the Real Plan, votes for state and
federal level were aligned, and the correlations between margins of governor and president for
the 1994 and 1998 elections (88%, 75%) make it difficult to identify separate effects. Therefore,
we consider only governor’s race margins and interpret the results as the effect of governor and
president.
14The taxing powers of levels of government are constitutionally defined in Brazil. Municipal
governments are authorized to levy taxes on services by firms established within their borders (or
services performed within them in some cases) and on urban real estate (property taxes on rural
real estate within municipal boundaries fall under federal authority).
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The existence of sectorial boards drawn from the target public makesman-
agement more transparent and participative and is an indicator of its quality.
The modernization of public administration is related to two important trans-
forming mechanisms: outsourcing and the computerization of services. Both
are associated with the contracting of private services, seeking greater effi-
ciency. These are complex processes, which we measured in simplified form
through the number of functions in a municipality subject to each of these
mechanisms.
In a system with perfect information, the re-election of the mayor is recog-
nition of his or her good administration, and thus should be related to his or
her efficiency. In the Brazilian electoral system, and given the average level
of voters’ education, this does not necessarily occur. Re-election of a mayor
in 1996, for which we have data, refers to a term that started in 1992, and
the second term ends in 2000. This covers most of our study period. We ex-
pect that municipalities where the mayor was re-elected were more efficient.
The re-election for mayor mandate was only possible after 1994, therefore
re-election for mayor was possible only for the 1996 election.
The intensity of the political dispute is an element that shapes the admin-
istration of public affairs and can act as an incentive to better management
or to patronage, in both cases a determinant of the efficiency with which ser-
vices are provided. This intensity is represented by a vote concentration in-
dex, considering the 16 parties receiving the most votes, in national terms,
and measured by the sum of the squares of the party shares in the municipal
elections (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index).
The electoral system in Brazil generates a lot of political parties. These
characteristics at the federal level have been studied in the literature, such
as Kinzo (1993) and Rodrigues (2002). But these characteristics are not nec-
essarily the same at the municipal level, where politics is focused more on
local questions (Schmtt 2000). The party effect was considered through four
dummy variables, one for each of the largest parties – PMDB, PSDB, PFL15
and PT – which are the parties of 60% of the mayors, representing 55% of the
population.
Besides these variables we also consider variables with the shape of munic-
ipality as control variables, the rate of urbanization, the age range (younger
than 10 and older than 65), gender and the Gini coefficient and spatial densi-
tiy of population.
4 Results
In this section we first discuss the treatment of the data, then analyze the
performance of the specifications adopted, and finally examine the estimates.
4.1 Treatment of the data
The data set comes from a combination of four sources: a) the annual spend-
ing accounts of the municipalities, produced by the Finance Ministry (avail-
able in its Finbra system); b) the indicators that are included in the Human
15Since the data were gathered for this study, the PFL has changed its name to the “Democrats”
or DEM.
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Development Index (HDI), mainly derived from the 1991 and 2001 Demo-
graphic Census, conducted by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statis-
tics (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, IBGE); c) the electoral data
made available by the Superior Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral,
TSE); and d) data from the Municipal Survey (Munic), also conducted by the
IBGE. A detailed description of the data is presented in the Appendix.
The number of municipalities increased from 266 in 1990 to 567 in 2000,
which made the population coverage of many municipalities variable over the
period. The IBGE has defined the concept of “minimum comparable area”
(Área mínima comparável, or AMC), which is a redefinition, stable for a cer-
tain period, of the concept of the municipality. The use of this concept has
the advantage of permitting analysis of the set, but hinders interpretation be-
cause these entities are not political decision-making units. In this case, these
entities should be viewed as being a “federation” of municipalities that gen-
erates the resources of the participating municipalities, whose results reflect
an average of the grouped region. For this reason, we estimated the model
with a version that organizes the base with AMCs and another that excludes
municipalities that were grouped in AMCs.
The source of information on public spending is the Brazilian Finances
database, made available by the National Treasury Secretariat (Finbra-STN),
part of the Finance Ministry, for the years 1989 and 1999. The public spend-
ing per municipality is the average amount per municipality of total budget
spending, deflated for the period, since data is missing for some municipali-
ties in some years. The deflator adopted for the 1995-1999 period is the INPC
(National Consumer Price Index) and that for the previous period is such that
the total average spending in each year is equal to the total spending in 1994.
It is difficult to measure public expenditures in a period of high infla-
tion16, because the distribution during the year is not known and varies by
municipality. This makes use of a price deflator inadequate. We decided to
deflate our spending series by the National Consumer Price Index (INPC) for
the period from 1995 on and adjusted17 for the period 1989-1995 to make the
total spending of all municipalities constant. To test how much this limita-
tion influences the results, we estimated the model in two versions: one with
the average per capita spending for the complete period (1989-1999); and the
other only for the period after monetary stabilization (1995-1999). O finbra
foi também utilizado para calcular a proporção das receitas municipais que
são transferências dos estados ou da federação.
The social indicator is derived from the calculations of the HDI for 1991
and 2000. We chose all the indicators that measure social conditions that fall
under local responsibility, namely 3 health indicators, 18 educational ones
(basic through secondary) and 3 indicators of the supply of public services in
general.
16Brazil suffered from very high and variable inflation during the study period (peaking as
high as 80% per month at times), punctuated by brief stable intervals, until the middle of 1994,
when stability was finally achieved. Since then average inflation has been at single-digit yearly
levels.
17. The spending is supplied in annual budgetary terms, so we do not know when the money
was actually spent. Deflating this spending by the averageNational Consumer Price Index (INPC)
produced results that were not very interpretable. With this procedure we do not have any way to
identify a possible temporal trend variation of spending, but it does ensure the coherence among
municipalities.
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Table 1: Correlation between Social Indicators (S) and social index (Sβ)
Health Indicators
Life expectancy at birth 0.56 Probability of living to 40 0.49
Mortality up to one year of
age
-0.50 Probability of living until
60
0.57




%of 5-6-year-olds in school 0.43 %of 15-17-year-olds with
fewer than 8 years of study
-0.56





0.51 %of 18-24-year-olds with
fewer than 4 years of study
-0.65
%of illiterate 7 to
14-year-olds
-0.48 %of 18-24-year-olds with
fewer than 8 years of study
-0.71
%of 7 to 14-year-olds with
one year of delay
-0.54 %of illiterates over 15 years
old
-0.71
%of illiterate 10 to
14-year-olds
-0.48 %of people 25 and over




over one year of delay
-0.54 %of people 25 and over




fewer than 4 years of study









fewer than 4 years of study
-0.55 Average years of study of
people 25 and over
0.73
Supply of Public Services
% of people living in
dwellings with piped water
0.49 % of people who live in
urban with trash collection
service
0.36
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of (x,z) variables
Variable mean Std.dev
Log of the municipality’s population in 1991 9.48 1.09
Number of municipalities in the AMC 1.29 1.12
Victory margin of the governor elected in 1994 0.09 0.09
Victory margin of the governor elected in 1998 0.11 0.11
Dummy for the second mandate in 98 state election 0.40 0.49
Total transfers/total revenue of the municipality 0.46 0.23
Number of computerized functions 7.76 2.32
Number of outsouced functions 3.37 2.59
1 if the mayor was reelected in 1996 0.25 0.41
Degree of concentration in the 1996 race for mayor 5.17 1.71
1 if the party of the mayor elected in 1996 was the PT 0.02 0.13
1 if the party of the mayor elected in 1996 was the PSDB 0.18 0.37
1 if the party of the mayor elected in 1996 was the
PMDB
0.24 0.41
1 if the party of the mayor elected in 1996 was the PFL 0.17 0.36
Existence of an education advisory board in 1998 0.75 0.42
Existence of a health board in 1998 0.98 0.14
Existence of social assistance advisory board in 1998 0.93 0.24
Source: authors calculation
Table 2 shows the list of the indicators utilized, and as an example, the
correlation between the quantity Sβ estimated in one of the models and each
of the social indicators, and shows that the correlation is positive with each
of the indicators whose increase indicates an improvement in conditions, and
negative with the rest. The quantity Sβ is a linear combination of S, and can
be interpreted as a synthetic indicator of the social conditions.
The source of electoral variables is the TSE files and consider votes for gov-
ernor in the 1994 and 1998 elections, votes formayor in the 1996 election, and
identification of governor and mayors in the second mandate. The variables
are:
• Margin of victory over the runner-up candidate measured by the differ-
ence in each municipality between the votes of the elected governor and
the votes of the runner-up candidate for the 1994 and 1998 elections;
• Dummy indicating whether the governor was re-elected in 1998
• Degree of concentration of the votes received by the parties: sum of the
squares of the party shares in the local election in 1996;
• Dummies indicating the mayor’s party;
• Dummy indicating whether the mayor was re-elected in 1996
The control Variables are: 1) density: total population/municipal surface;
2) rural inhabitants/total; 3) aged under 10/total; 4) aged over 65/total; 5)
women/total, 6) scale: log of the population.
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Table 3: Inforamtion Criteria
Original Scale
Homo Hetero
aic bic Hq Aic bic hq
S1,s0 0.205 0.331 0.250 0.164 0.290 0.209
S1+s0 0.241 0.322 0.269 0.199 0.280 0.227
S1-s0 0.415 0.496 0.443 0.374 0.455 0.403
Spatial Dif (∆w)
Homo Hetero
aic bic Hq Aic bic hq
S1,s0 0.114 0.240 0.158 0.112 0.239 0.157
S1+s0 0.123 0.204 0.151 0.122 0.203 0.151
S1-s0 0.265 0.346 0.294 0.262 0.343 0.290
4.2 Specifications
The estimate of the inefficiency ofmunicipal management and the effect of the
explanatory variables depends on three questions: 1) the form of insertion of
the efficiency determinants, equations (1) and (2); 2) the form of the alloca-
tion function of the social indicators: variation, level or unrestricted form;
3) the choice of the information set – the effect of considering only the non-
fragmented municipalities – and the measure of public spending; and finally
4)the results can be obtained with or without correction for omitted variables.
This makes a total of 36 models.
To simplify matters, we present the performance criteria for the case us-
ing the expenditures over the entire decade and without restriction to non-
fragmented municipalities. This gives us 12 models with the same dependent
variable. This means that we can choose the specification that most closely ad-
heres to the data using the standard information criteria in the econometrics
literature, namely: AIC, BIC and HQ18. Table 3 present these results.
In the model estimated with the variables in the original scale, the best
specification according to the criteria (aic,hq) is the heterogeneous model with
the social variables in unrestricted form (s1,s0). In the case of the variables
transformed with the operator (∆w), the best model, according to the criteria
(bic, hq) is the heterogeneous model with the social variables in level (s1+s0).
In all cases, the algorithm estimated an asymmetric term identified with a
variance significantly different than zero, which indicates that the unobserv-
able component that measures the distance from the frontier does not have
a spatial trend. In this case with the variables transformed by the operator
(∆w), this component corresponds to the deviation of the distance from the
frontier and the results indicate that the asymmetry property is preserved for
this transformation.
18. Respectively, Akaike’s information criterion, Bayesian information criterion and the
Hanna-Quim criterion (see Lütkepohl (1991).
366 Motta and Moreira Economia Aplicada, v.13, n.4
4.3 Estimates
The estimates are presented for the coefficients of the variables that explain
the cost of supplying the service and the determinants of inefficiency. For both
cases the table shows the results of the three information sets: spending in
the entire decade (c90), spending in the second five years (c95), and spending
in the decade limited to the non-fragmented AMCs (c89x), this is combined
with the (c90,c95) cases for the model with the variables transformed by the
operator (∆w)19 that mitigate the effect of non observed variables.
The results obtained with the best model for data in original scale and
transformed by the operator (∆w) are organized in tables 4 and 5 according
to the type of determinant. To evaluate the robustness of these results we
estimated the model g |S,x,z using OLS and robust standard errors, and ob-
tained, qualitatively, the same results. To simplify matters, we omitted the
coefficients of the social indicators and control variables and coefficients not
significant at the 10% level.
Table 4 shows that all coefficients are significant (1%) for all versions es-
timated, except the coefficient related to federal transfers, which is not sig-
nificant for the c95 case. The results are almost the same for all versions,
despite the criticism of the low quality of data before 1995 and of the effect of
aggregation of municipalities in AMC.
An increase of scale and a decrease in fragmentation reduce the spend-
ing required to obtain the same amount of social result. The governors have
the option of allocating in discretionary form a fraction of the public expen-
ditures under their control, and thus can do so as a way to satisfy collective
interests or according to electoral logic. These expenditures are not observed,
but we can observe the result of this action in terms of votes. The results
show a patronage relationship between the governor candidate and his or her
base constituencies for governor candidate in 1994 and 1998. This evidence
indicates that the greater the loss margin of the elected governor in the mu-
nicipality, the lower that municipality’s spending, which can indicate the ex-
istence of focused and direct expenditures of the state government in the area
of education and health.
In the 1994 election there was no possibility of re-election, so all the can-
didates were new entrants, unlike the 1998 election. The dummy variable in-
dicates the municipalities located in states where the governor was re-elected.
The result shows that the governor’s re-election implies higher spending for
the same social state, suggesting that a second-term governor exercises less
cronyism than a first-term one, who stil has a chance of re-election.
For the first information set, spending over the whole decade (c90, c90x
de-c90), the higher proportion of municipal revenue received as transfers im-
plies increased spending for the same social result. These resources come
from the state or federal treasury and are monitored by the respective audit
tribunals. The fact that this variable is significant when we consider the entire
decade but not for the end of the decade can be related to the more efficient
monitoring of these expenditures at the end of the decade.
Table 5 shows that the significance of the coefficients depends on the ver-
sion. Only the effect of the number of computerized and outsourced functions
is significant at the 1% level for all the cases studied. This is an unexpected
19The algorithm do not get convergence for the c90x in this case.
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Table 4: Effect on Spending
Sample
Level Spatial dif
c90 c95 c90x c90 c95
Log of the municipality’s
population in 1991
−0.33 −0.30 −0.35 −0.31 −0.31
Number of municipalities in the
AMC
0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06
Victory margin of the governor
elected in 1994
0.42 0.41 0.38 0.35 0.36
Victory margin of the governor
elected in 1998
0.24 0.29 0.27 0.34 0.34
Dummy for the second mandate
in 98 state election
0.13 0.15 0.13 0.16 0.15
Total transfers/total revenue of
the municipality
0.24 − 0.22 0.28 −
Coefficient Significant for 1%
a Coefficient Significant for 5%
a Coefficient Significant for 10%
result. The inefficiency increases when the number of computerized and out-
sourced functions is higher. In other words, more computerized and dele-
gated management does not generate productive gains or increase the level of
transparency and control enough to make it more efficient. Thus words, these
gains do not offset the cost incurred to adopt these practices.
The effect of the dummy variable for a reelected mayor is significant for
most of the cases, indicating a correlation with the reduction of inefficiency.
The other variables are related to local politics. The degree of concentration
of voters in the race for mayor and political party of the elected mayor and
the relations with the existence of citizens’ boards are not significant for the
spatial difference regression. These effects are not robust. This suggests that
these variables are not related to better management, implying an asymmetry
of information in the local political market.
5 Conclusion
The quality of life represented by the population’s state of health and educa-
tion – largely atributes of municipal responsibility – can be characterized by
social indicators obtained from census data, and are multiple-interdependent
attributes. Municipal administration can be viewed as a productive unit that
uses a technology that associates expenditures with welfare and is represented
by a production possibility frontier. The distance of each municipality from
this frontier is a measure of the inefficiency of its administration.
The transformation of spending into public services that conditions the
state of education and health is a complex and slow process, which depends
on the volume of expenditures, the conditioning factors of the production
cost and the inefficiency with which these expenditures are made. This inef-
ficiency, in turn, depends on the relation between the benefit obtained by the
manager and the cost of his or her effort. Therefore, the heterogeneity of the
inefficiency among municipalities can be explained both by the incentives the
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Table 5: Explaining Inefficiency
Level Spatial dif
c90 c95 c90x c90 c95
Number of computerized
functions
0.16 0.15 0.16 0.08 0.10
Number of outsoucer
functions
0.17 0.17 0.16 0.10 0.11
1 if the mayor was reelected
in 1996
−0.15b −0.15b - −0.22 −0.17a
Degree of concentration in
the 1996 race for mayor
− − − − −
1 if the party of the mayor
elected in 1996 was the PT
0.54b - 0.64a − −
1 if the party of the mayor
elected in 1996 was the
PSDB
− − − − −
1 if the party of the mayor
elected in 1996 was the
PMDB
−0.30a - −0.29a - −
1 if the party of the mayor
elected in 1996 was the PFL
− − − − −
Existence of an education
advisory board in 1998
- −0.21b − − −
Existence of a health board
in 1998
− − − − −
Existence of social assistance
advisory board in 1998
−0.34b − − − −
Coefficient Significant for 1%
a Coefficient Significant for 5%
a Coefficient Significant for 10%
public administrator perceives to endeavour to be more efficient and by the
local supply conditions that alter the marginal cost of this effort.
This study related the observed production cost of municipal service with
measures of the final aim of this service in order to obtain a substantive mea-
sure of the efficiency of municipal public service and to evaluate whether po-
litical patronage and other political economy measures affect this result.
The model adopted estimates a production possibility frontier that relates
a measure of the state of the population, to the per capita spending in condi-
tional form to the cost of supplying the service and the incentives for efficient
spending. In order to mitigate the effect of omitted variables the model uses
spatial trend differences.
We estimated various specifications for this model using different mea-
sures of spending, ways to measure the effect on the population’s state, and
criteria to identify inefficiency an approach that mitigates the effect of omitted
variables that are stable in the spatial dimension. Our results were the same
for nearly all the specifications. The most robust ones indicate that: 1) the
greater the size of the total population the lower will be the per capita spend-
ing to obtain similar performance results in the social indicators chosen; 2)
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the dismemberment of municipalities increased this spending and that there
is an indication that governors reward their municipal voters with higher dis-
cretionary spending; 3) the margin of votes for a governor race has an effect on
allocation of state spend between municipalities; 4) the efficiency is decreased
by greater computerization or outsourcing of services; and finally 5) the ex-
istence of local advisory boards and political competition in the mayoral race
did not affect the level of efficiency of local management.
In sum, the size of the spending needed to attain a certain level of qual-
ity is associated with some characteristics of municipalities, scale, municipal
fragmentation and patronage of an elected governor. The fact that the local
political variables were not significant, on the other hand, evidences the exis-
tence of information asymmetry in the local electoral process.
Although the results are suggestive for the understanding of municipal
political economies, they must be taken with caution because with this type
of data we can only measure non-causal effects, and because the observed
political and institutional variables only covered the last half of the decade
under study a limitation that could only be corrected with a broader data set.
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